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A Failure Masked as a Succeeding War Effort:  
The Vietnam War 
 
Willow Hasson 




The conflict between the United States      and North Vietnam from 1965 to 1973 
showcases a failure of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. government and media put American 
exceptionalism ahead of reality and became tangled in an inescapable war. Focusing on the time 
during and around the spring and summer of 1965, when the U.S. government escalated the 
conflict into an undeclared war, the      government was not transparent with the American 
public. The Johnson administration projected this conflict as a Cold War example that could be 
set for Southeast Asia and thus protect the world from communism. The press covered this 
conflict through an idealistic lens that supported and did not      sufficiently question      the 
president’s continuation of the war. Meanwhile, a large portion of the South Vietnamese 
population, which the U.S. aimed to “protect,” was part of the Viet Cong insurgency (also known 
as      the National Liberation Front) that was behind the Northern Communist agenda and used 
guerilla warfare to wear down the U.S. military as U.S. bombs failed to yield a surrender. The 
American public was aware of the costs of war, but unaware of the failures of the war effort. The 
media fueled patriotism and then reported on how the majority of Americans supported the 
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misunderstood war in a cycle of misinformation. Behind closed doors, U.S. policymakers were 
well aware of how victory was elusive. Despite this knowledge, the government kept the 
weakness of South Vietnam and the uncertainty of the war effort quiet in the hope that the U.S. 
would suddenly overcome its challenges as the hegemon that it was assumed to be. A      focused 
lens on the spring and summer of 1965 characterizes the conflict in Vietnam as a failure of 
diplomacy and military strategy that was covered up by the government and then misrepresented 
by the media as a war that was deserving of the public’s support: all because the U.S. 
government saw communism in Northern Vietnam as a threat to American exceptionalism. 
The conflict in Vietnam leading up until U.S. entry could have been viewed as a post-
colonial Civil War within Vietnam. Instead, because the U.S. government viewed Ho Chi Minh’s 
Viet Minh forces as communists and not nationalists, the American government and media 
characterized the Vietnamese struggle as a critical Cold War issue of communism versus      
democracy. The U.S. wanted a new liberal order after World War II that included smaller 
countries like Vietnam because future economic prosperity and hegemony “would depend on 
creating an integrated world market.”1 Essentially, for the U.S. to gain and maintain power, 
communism could not be permitted to rise in any nation and risk challenging the American 
economy and political model. The U.S. officials also believed that governments worldwide 
would doubt the credibility of American commitments and that enemies would be emboldened to 
foment insurgencies elsewhere if the U.S. stopped backing South      Vietnam or conceded to a 
negotiation.2 To stop the spread of communism, the U.S. government escalated its forces and 
                                               
1 Robert Buzzanco, “International Capitalism and Communism Collide with Vietnamese Nationalism,” in 
Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Since 1914, III, ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson 
(Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2010), 422. 
 
2 Mark Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 73. 
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used the press to ensure that the American public would back U.S. intervention—no matter how 
bleak the war’s outlook became. 
On July 28, 1965, President Johnson gave a press conference about the conflict in 
Vietnam and emphasized how the U.S. needed to be a part of the struggle that would affect the 
world.3 The day after, on July 29, the newspaper The Sun published an article, titled “War in 
Vietnam,” that emphasized Johnson’s points to the public by printing that winning the war would 
be “of vital importance to South Vietnam, to North Vietnam, to the United States, to Communist 
China, to the Soviet Union and to other powers.”4 This is a clear example of the press working 
for the U.S. government instead of working to check the government’s actions. There is no 
discourse present in the article, just a rallying of support for military involvement. The article 
emphasizes its biased message by saying that the p     resident, and thus the war as a whole, 
deserve public support.5 The rhetoric of the president and the press resonated with the American 
people, who wanted to believe that American exceptionalism was enduring and that the U.S. was 
fighting for a noble cause. A poll taken by The Washington Post before the spring and summer of 
escalation, in December of 1965, found that seventy-one percent of Americans surveyed were in 
favor of continuing the fighting in Vietnam until the U.S. could negotiate a settlement on its own 
terms.6 A majority of the U.S. public, at the beginning of the war, paid attention to and backed 
                                               
3 “War in Vietnam.” The Sun (1837-1994), Jul 29, 1965, Proquest: Historical Newspapers, accessed 







6 Louis Harris, “Administration Backed on Tactics in Viet-Nam: Bombing Hanoi Blockading North Viet-
Nam Ports Key Viet-Nam Policies,” The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973), Sep 13, 1965, Proquest: 
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U.S. actions because the U.S. effort was portrayed as noble by the government and by the press, 
which did not question the morals of the conflict.  
At the outset of U.S. military escalation, the cycle of media support encouraging public 
support of the war and government was facilitated and encouraged by the U.S. government. An 
article published by The New York Times on Jul 30, 1965, titled “Praise in South Vietnam,” 
stated that the political and religious factions in Saigon “praised President Johnson’s 
announcement of an increase of 50,000 troops to the United States force in Vietnam” and that the 
majority of Southern Vietnamese wanted an American build-up in their region.7 The American 
press made American soldiers seem like liberators who were welcomed by the Southern 
Vietnamese. The truth was that      the Southern Vietnamese government was so unstable that the 
U.S. considered backing a coup on multiple occasions because no regime was supported by a 
majority of the Vietnamese public or religious factions.8 According to a formerly classified 
telegram f     rom the Commander in Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the government was well 
aware by August 23, 1965, that there was a large insurgency presence of the Viet Cong in the 
South that was working with the Northern Vietnamese forces from Hanoi to force out the 
American military.9 Thus, a large part of the Southern Vietnamese population war in support of 
the Northern communist forces over U.S. forces. Another clear mark of secrecy within the U.S. 
                                               
7 “Praise in South Vietnam,” New York Times (1923-Current file), Jul 30, 1965, special to The New York 
Times, Proquest: Historical Newspapers, accessed November 24, 2019, 
http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/116941804?accountid=11243. 
 
8 Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, telegram, Washington, January 4, 1965, 6:48 p.m. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, II, Vietnam, January–June 1965 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 2010), Document 4, accessed November 25, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d4. 
 
9 Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram, Honolulu, August 23, 1965, 
2:30 p.m. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, III, Vietnam, June-December 1965 (Washington: 








government over the instability in Southern Vietnam was the secret telegram sent from the 
Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam on January 4, 1965, that discussed supporting a 
coup to overtake the unpopular regime, but American officials feared confrontation with a new 
military government that might have an anti-U.S. bias and “lend encouragement to the anti-
American manifestations already evident in Buddhist and certain student groups.”10 This 
telegram directly counters the press coverage that the Southern Vietnamese had a stable 
government and that the whole population wanted to be aided by American liberators. The 
aforementioned New York Times article from Jul 30, 1965, also reported that the Buddhist 
leadership in Saigon “appeared to welcome the report of the United States troop increase” even 
though the official spokesman had declined to make a statement.11 The press wanted all groups 
in Southern Vietnam, including the Buddhists who were persecuted by the US-supported regime, 
to seem as though they were in favor of U.S. military actions. In reality, a declassified telegram 
from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State from August 17, 1965, states that, in an 
interview by The Hong Kong Far Eastern Economic Review interview, the Buddhist leader Tri 
Quang denounced the government and General Thieu in particular, whom the U.S. was 
supporting.12 Quang was even quoted as saying that he and “the people” were against the 
government and hoped that the war could be stopped as soon as possible by a cease-fire or “by 
                                               
10 Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, telegram, Washington, January 4, 1965, 6:48 p.m. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, II, Vietnam, January–June 1965 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 2010), Document 4, accessed November 25, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d4. 
 
11 “Praise in South Vietnam.”  
 
12 Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, telegram, Saigon, August 17, 1965. Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1964–1968, III, Vietnam, June-December 1965 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
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any negotiations which would have the peoples’ support” and that Vietnam could rely on itself 
and “certainly on no outsider.”13 Thus, the rhetoric that all the Southern Vietnamese wanted the 
U.S. to continue fighting for a full victory and keep General Thieu in power was a lie by the U.S. 
government that the press perpetrated—whether consciously or unconsciously. 
 Some journalists reported on U.S. casualties and mixed reviews about the war, but for 
the most part, the press remained on the jingoist government’s side of the conflict throughout 
1965. Even in June of 1966, a year after the aforementioned escalation of troops, a New York 
Times article printed the interview of a North Vietnamese captain who had deserted his forces; 
he was interviewed to make the war effort appear victorious and thus garner American public 
support which was “key to victory.”14 The former captain was reported as saying that he is just 
one of many people who think the United States, the South Vietnamese and the South Korean, 
Australian and New Zealand allies were “clearly winning” and that “hardly anyone in Vietnam” 
argues that the United States is losing.15 The article then gives the statistic that “about 57,000 
Vietcong guerrillas and North Vietnamese army regulars have been killed in action and counted 
on the battlefield since Jan 1, 1965” to prove that the U.S. is already winning the war and that all 
the war effort needs is more time to win as long as the U.S. public opinion stays behind the war 
effort.16 This article brings the responsibility of the war to its readers and even uses a false claim 
                                               
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Charles Mohr, “Many in Vietnam Say Opinion in U.S. Is Key to Victory: G.I.'s Tend to Feel They Can 
Win the War If Permitted to Remain Long Enough Following Is the First of Three Articles Appraising the Military 
Situation in South Vietnam by the Chief Correspondent of the New York Times in Saigon: Vietnam Victory Linked 
to Opinion,” New York Times (1923-Current file), Jun 27, 1966, Proquest: Historical Newspapers, accessed 












that “statistically, the war has been won several times already”17 which ignores the fact that no 
matter how many enemy soldiers were killed, the Northern Vietnam forces remained resilient. 
Before, during, and after the escalation of U.S. forces in the summer of 1965, the U.S. 
government consistently hid the knowledge that the war was leaning towards disaster to preserve 
public opinion because domestic support was crucial to the war effort. 
The Johnson administration saw the sentiments of the American public as the key to 
success through the continuation of the war. This assumption meant that the government used all 
of its power to ensure a positive media-image of the war—even though this meant 
misinformation and secrecy. Johnson’s fear of the public turning against him even affected his 
war policy. Johnson initiated a “limited war strategy of graduated pressure” through sustained 
bombing programs, like “Operation Rolling Thunder” (initiated in March of 1965), in the place 
of an all-out war because he perceived that U.S. citizens would not want to see strategic airpower 
blow the enemy “out of the water.”18 Thus, the war effort was slow and government officials lied 
about the failure of their war plans. In April of 1965, amidst the first anti-war march on 
Washington in which more than fifteen thousand protesters attended,19 Johnson attempted to 
appease the public by consciously misleading the American people and Congress.20 The 
administration downplayed the escalation by explaining the bombing of North Vietnam simply 
as retaliation for communist attacks in the South; Johnson also never announced the switch to 
sustained strikes, which “committed the United States to a major war without ever forthrightly 
                                               
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Thomas G. Paterson et al., American Foreign Relations: A History, Volume 2: Since 1895, 8th ed. 
(Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2015), 372. 
 
19 Mark Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 93. 
 
20 Thomas G. Paterson et al., American Foreign Relations, 371. 
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saying so.”21 Initially, the press was continuously reporting the war as an effort that would 
become a future total victory. However, the public and press were unaware of how dire the 
situation in Vietnam had become for the U.S. in the spring and summer of 1965.  
In a top-secret paper written by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball to United States 
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, who would report to Johnson, on July 1, 1965, Ball 
made it apparent that the U.S. and Southern Vietnamese forces were losing the war.22 This 
document was later leaked by The New York Times under the Pentagon Papers which proved that 
the Johnson administration had knowingly lied to the public to draw support for the failing war.23  
Ball wrote to Bundy in the telegram that “[n]o one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong 
or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand 
white foreign (US) troops we deploy.”24 The document then continues to contradict the media’s 
portrayal of a war effort that just needed more time and support by stating that “[n]o one has 
demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war . . . in jungle 
terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces” citing examples 
of failures like “[t]he B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped 
off,” which proves that the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam were undermining U.S. military 
attempts.25 Ball then attempts to make Bundy and Johnson consider abandoning the conflict 
                                               
21 Mark Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 93. 
 
22 Ball, George W. “A Compromise Solution for South Viet-nam.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1964–1968, III, Vietnam, June-December 1965, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 40. 
Top Secret, Sent by Under Secretary of State Ball to McGeorge Bundy on July 1, 1965, Washington, undated. Also 













completely for negotiations because “the war is vastly unpopular,” the American role in the 
conflict is “perceptibly eroding the respect and confidence with which other nations regard [the 
US],” and because further involvement is not essential to the defense of freedom in the Cold 
War.”26 When the media reported on battles won by the US, public opinion polls that supported 
the war, and interviews by government officials who made victory sound simple, the press was 
missing the truth behind the government's story.  
Eventually, the slow progress of the war could not stay ahead of the public opinion which 
changed from supportive to dissenting. The anti-war movement grew as it crossed lines of 
identity and melded into a national unstructured movement that eventually pushed the U.S. 
government to recede.27 Later, the media changed and reflected the negative public opinion 
instead of the government's false positivity, like the article “Major Vietnam Offensives Fail to 
Catch up With . . .” from The Sun published on Jan 12, 1966, which focused on how two major 
United States drives and separate operations by Vietnamese troops “failed to flush the Viet Cong 
from the jungles” and characterized these events as failed attempts without including that the war 
effort would prevail.28 Even in the Senate, elite “doves” like Senator William Fulbright decried 
the war effort as arrogance on the American side.29 Fulbright wrote, in a Congressional Record 
in May of 1966, that by continuing the war the U.S. was giving up an “opportunity to set an 




27 Thomas G. Paterson et al., American Foreign Relations, 375. 
 
28 “Major Vietnam Offensives Fail to Catch up With.” The Sun (1837-1994), Jan 12, 1966, Proquest: 
Historical Newspapers, accessed November 25, 2019, 
http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/539612513?accountid=11243. 
 
29 William J. Fulbright, “Senator J. William Fulbright Decries the ‘Arrogance of Power,’ 1966,” in Major 
Problems in American Foreign Relations: Since 1914, III, ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston, MA: 
Wadsworth, 2010), 418. 
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example of generous understanding . . . with China, of practical cooperation for peace . . . with 
Russia . . . of material helpfulness without moral presumption in our relations with the 
developing nations, [and] of abstention from the temptations of hegemony . . .”30 The war was 
unwinnable, and this fact was eventually impossible to hide. “In the end, no American strategy 
could have reversed the outcome in Vietnam, because the Viet Cong and its North Vietnamese 
allies had committed to total war” and was prepared to sustain casualties far beyond American 
estimates.31 Also, even though the media made the Saigon government seem stable, Diem was 
hated for his persecution of the Buddhists and no government after Diem was assassinated was 
credible enough to create a lasting success at war.32 The American government viewed its forces 
as invincible, and this made the U.S. government continue to keep forces in Vietnam up until 
1973,33 despite the anti-American sentiment in South Vietnam and the public outcry at home. 
Ultimately, the failures of the war were kept secret and the Johnson administration continued the 
war because of the enduring American agenda of hegemony and the need to assert power. 
Truly, the U.S. government stayed involved in the unwinnable Vietnam War even when 
the press and public had turned against the war because of the lasting theory of American 
exceptionalism. The U.S. government continued the war and lied to its public because it could 
not face the reality that a small country like North Vietnam could force out the great American 
hegemon and victor of WWII.  This hegemonic status made government officials feel that the 
U.S. had a “special right to exert power in the world” and that any source of communism that 
                                               
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Robert K. Brigham, “An Unwinnable War,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Since 




33 Thomas G. Paterson et al., American Foreign Relations, 393. 
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threatened this power should be crushed to ensure that America would remain the superior 
“destined beacon of liberty” that it was perceived to be.34 Overall, the government hid proof that 
American soldiers were not wanted, that the Southern Vietnamese government was unstable and 
unpopular, and that the war was failing through only-positive press conferences and secrecy, and 
the media followed suit in its idealistic reports of success, manipulated interviews, and polls that 
encouraged support in order to continue the war to prove American exceptionalism to mask the 
reality that U.S. Foreign policy had failed. 
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